Privacy Preserving Gaze Estimation using Synthetic Images via a
  Randomized Encoding Based Framework by Bozkir, Efe et al.
Privacy Preserving Gaze Estimation using Synthetic Images via a Randomized
Encoding Based Framework
Efe Bozkir∗†1 Ali Burak U¨nal∗‡2 Mete Akgu¨n†2,3 Enkelejda Kasneci†1 Nico Pfeifer‡2
1Human-Computer Interaction 2Methods in Medical Informatics 3Translational Bioinformatics
Department of Computer Science, University of Tu¨bingen
Sand 14, 72076, Tu¨bingen, Germany
Abstract
Eye tracking is handled as one of the key technologies for ap-
plications that assess and evaluate human attention, behavior,
and biometrics, especially using gaze, pupillary, and blink be-
haviors. One of the main challenges with regard to the social
acceptance of eye tracking technology is however the pre-
serving of sensitive and personal information. To tackle this
challenge, we employ a privacy-preserving framework based
on randomized encoding to train a Support Vector Regression
model on synthetic eye images privately to estimate the human
gaze. During the computation, none of the parties learn about
the data or the result that any other party has. Furthermore,
the party that trains the model cannot reconstruct pupil, blink
or visual scanpath. The experimental results show that our
privacy-preserving framework is also capable of working in
real-time, with the same accuracy as compared to non-private
version and could be further extended to other eye tracking
related problems.
Introduction
With the recent advances in the fields of smart glasses and
Head-Mounted-Display (HMD) technology, computer graph-
ics, augmented reality (AR) and eye tracking, numerous novel
applications are becoming available. One of the most natural
and non-intrusive ways of interaction with these devices is
achieved by gaze-contingent interfaces using eye tracking.
However, it is possible to derive a lot of sensitive and per-
sonal information from eye tracking data such as intentions,
behaviors, preferences or fatigue due to the fact that eyes are
not fully controlled in a conscious way.
It has been shown that cognitive load (Chen and Epps 2014;
Appel et al. 2018), visual attention (Bozkir, Geisler, and
Kasneci 2019), stress (Ku¨bler et al. 2014), task identifica-
tion (Borji and Itti 2014), skill level assessment and ex-
pertise (Liu et al. 2009; Eivazi et al. 2017; Castner et al.
2018), human activity (Steil and Bulling 2015; Braunagel
et al. 2017), biometric information and authentication (Kin-
nunen, Sedlak, and Bednarik 2010; Komogortsev et al. 2010;
∗Equally contributed
†efe.bozkir, mete.akguen, enkelejda.kasneci@uni-tuebingen.de
‡uenal, pfeifer@informatik.uni-tuebingen.de
Komogortsev and Holland 2013; Zhang et al. 2018; Ab-
drabou et al. 2019), or personality traits (Berkovsky et al.
2019) can be obtained using eye movements and eye track-
ing data. Since highly sensitive information can be derived
from eye tracking data, it is not very surprising that HMDs,
smart glasses or similar devices have not been adopted by
large communities yet. According to a recent survey (Steil
et al. 2019a), people agree to share their eye tracking data
only when it is co-owned by a governmental health-agency
or is used for research purposes. This indicates that people
are hesitant about sharing their eye tracking data in com-
mercial applications. Therefore, there is a likelihood that
larger communities could adopt HMDs or smart glasses if
privacy-preserving techniques are applied in the eye tracking
applications. The reasons why privacy preserving schemes
are needed for eye tracking are discussed in (Liebling and
Preibusch 2014) extensively. However, until now, there are
not many studies concentrated on privacy-preserving eye
tracking. Recently, a method to detect privacy sensitive ev-
eryday situations (Steil et al. 2019b), an approach to degrade
iris authentication while keeping the gaze tracking utility in
acceptable accuracy (John, Koppal, and Jain 2019), and differ-
ential privacy based techniques to protect personal informa-
tion on heatmaps and eye movement features (Liu et al. 2019;
Steil et al. 2019a) are introduced. While differential pri-
vacy can be applied to eye tracking data for various tasks
and used effectively, it introduces additional noise on the
data which causes decrease in the utility (Liu et al. 2019;
Steil et al. 2019a), and might lead to less accurate results
in computer vision tasks, such as gaze estimation, intention
detection or activity recognition.
In light of the above, function-specific privacy models are
required. In this work, we focus on the gaze estimation prob-
lem as a proof-of-concept by using synthetic data including
eye landmarks and ground truth gaze vectors. However, the
same privacy-preserving approach can be further extended to
any feature-based, eye tracking problem such as intention, fa-
tigue or personality trait detection, in HMD or unconstrained
setups due to the demonstrated real-time working capabilities.
In our study, the gaze estimation task is solved by using Sup-
port Vector Regression (SVR) models in a privacy-preserving
manner by computing the dot product of eye landmark vec-
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tors to obtain the kernel matrix of the SVR for a scenario,
where two parties have the eye landmark data, each of which
we call input-party, and one function-party that trains a pre-
diction model on the data of the input-parties. This scenario
is relevant when the input-parties use eye tracking data to im-
prove the accuracy of their models and do not share the data
due to the privacy concerns. To this end, we utilize a frame-
work employing randomized encoding (U¨nal, Akgu¨n, and
Pfeifer 2019). In the computation, neither the eye images nor
the extracted features are revealed to the function-party di-
rectly. Furthermore, the input-parties do not infer the raw eye
tracking data or result of the computation. Eye images that
are used for training and testing are rendered using UnityEyes
(Wood et al. 2016) synthetically and 36 landmark-based fea-
tures (Park et al. 2018) are used. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study that applies a privacy-preserving scheme
based on function-specific privacy models on an eye tracking
problem.
Threat Model
We assume that the input-parties are semi-honest (honest but
curious) that are not allowed to deviate from the protocol
description while they try to infer some valuable information
about other parties’ private inputs using their views of the
protocol execution. We also assume that the function-party is
malicious and the input-parties and the function-party do not
collude.
Methodology
In this section, we discuss the data generation, randomized
encoding, and privacy-preserving framework based on ran-
domized encoding using SVR.
Data Generation
To train and evaluate the gaze estimator, we generate eye im-
ages and gaze vectors. Since our work is a proof-of-concept
and requires high amount of data, synthetic eye images
from UnityEyes (Wood et al. 2016), which is based on the
Unity3D game engine, are used. Camera parameters and
Eye parameters are chosen as (0, 0, 0, 0) (fixed camera) and
(0, 0, 30, 30) (eyeball pose range parameters in degrees), re-
spectively. 20, 000 images are rendered in Fantastic graphics
quality setting and 512× 384 screen resolution. Afterwards,
data processing and normalization pipeline from (Park et al.
2018) is employed. In the end, we obtain 128× 96 sized eye
images, 18 eye landmarks including eight iris edge, eight
eyelid, one iris center, and one iris-center-eyeball-center vec-
tor normalized according to Euclidean distance between two
eye corners and gaze vectors including pitch and yaw angles.
Final feature vectors consist of 36 normalized elements. An
example illustration is shown in Figure 1.
Randomized Encoding
The framework that is utilized employs randomized encoding
(RE) (Applebaum, Ishai, and Kushilevitz 2006b; Applebaum,
Ishai, and Kushilevitz 2006a) to compute the element-wise
multiplication of the landmark vectors, which is then used to
compute the dot product of these vectors. Dot product of the
(a) Landmarks. (b) Gaze.
Figure 1: Eye landmarks and gaze on an example synthetic
image.
landmark vectors is needed to compute kernel matrix of the
SVR which is later used for training the gaze estimator and
validation of the framework.
In the randomized encoding, the computation of a function
f(x) is performed by a randomized function fˆ(x; r) where
x is the input value, which corresponds to eye landmarks in
our setup, and r is the random value. The idea is to encode
the original function by using random value(s) such that the
combination of the components of the encoding reveals only
the output of the original function. In the framework, the com-
putation of the dot product is accomplished by utilizing the
decomposable and affine randomized encoding (DARE) of
addition and multiplication (Applebaum 2017). The encoding
of multiplication is as follows.
Definition 1 (Perfect RE for Multiplication (Applebaum
2017)). A multiplication function is defined as fm(x1, x2) =
x1 · x2 over a ring R. One can perfectly encode the fm by
employing the DARE fˆm(x1, x2; r1, r2, r3):
fˆm(x1, x2; r1, r2, r3) = (x1 + r1, x2 + r2,
r2x1 + r3, r1x2 + r1r2 − r3),
where r1, r2 and r3 are uniformly chosen random values. The
recovery of fm(x1, x2) can be accomplished by computing
c1 · c2 − c3 − c4 where c1 = x1 + r1, c2 = x2 + r2, c3 =
r2x1 + r3 and c4 = r1x2 + r1r2 − r3. The simulation of fˆm
can be done perfectly by the simulator Sim(y; a1, a2, a3) :=
(a1, a2, a3, a1a2−y−a3) where a1, a2 a3 are random values.
Framework
To perform the private gaze estimation task in our scenario,
we inspire from the framework as in (U¨nal, Akgu¨n, and
Pfeifer 2019) due to its efficiency compared to other ap-
proaches in the literature. The framework is proposed to com-
pute the addition or multiplication of the input values of two
input-parties in the function-party by utilizing randomized
encoding. We utilize the multiplication operation over the eye
landmark vectors to compute the dot product of these vectors
to obtain kernel matrix of the SVR in a privacy-preserving
way.
We have two input-parties as Alice and Bob, having the
eye landmark data as X ∈ Rnf×na and Y ∈ Rnf×nb
where na and nb represent the number of samples in Al-
ice and Bob, respectively, and nf is the number of fea-
tures. In addition to the input-parties, there exists a server
that trains a model on the data of the input-parties. It is
Figure 2: Overall protocol execution.
worth to note that A.j for any matrix A represents the
j-th column of the corresponding matrix and ”“ repre-
sents the element-wise multiplication of the vectors. As a
first step, Alice creates a uniformly chosen random value
r3 ∈ R and two vectors r1, r2 ∈ Rnf with uniformly cho-
sen random values, which are used to encode the element-
wise multiplication of the vectors. Then, Alice shares them
with Bob. Afterwards, Bob computes C2.j = Y.j + r2 and
C4j =
∑nf
d=1(r1  Y.j + r1  r2)d − r3, ∀j ∈ {1, · · · , nb}
where C2 ∈ Rnf×nb and C4 ∈ Rnb . Meanwhile, Alice com-
putes C1.i = X.i + r1 and C
3
i =
∑nf
d=1(r2  X.i)d + r3,
∀i ∈ {1, · · · , na} where C1 ∈ Rnf×na and C3 ∈ Rna .
Input-parties send their share of the encoding to the server
with the gram matrix of their samples, which is the dot prod-
uct among their samples. Then, the server computes the dot
product between samples of Alice and Bob to complete the
missing part of the gram matrix of all samples. To achieve
this, the server computes kij =
∑nf
d=1(C
1
.iC2.j)d−C3i −C4j ,
∀i ∈ {1, · · · , na} and ∀j ∈ {1, · · · , nb}where kij is the i-th
row j-th column entry of the gram matrix between the sam-
ples of the input-parties. Once the server has all components
of the gram matrix, it constructs the complete gram matrix
K by simply concatenating the parts of it. In our solution,
Alice and Bob send to the server (C1, C3) and (C2, C4) tu-
ples, respectively. These components reveal nothing but only
the gram matrix of the samples after decoding. Furthermore,
the input-parties shuffle their raw data before the computa-
tion to avoid the possibility of private information leakage
such as the behavior of the person due to the nature of the
visual sequence information. The overall flow between the
input-parties and server is summarized in Figure 2.
After having the complete gram matrix for all samples that
Alice and Bob have, the server uses it as a kernel matrix as if
it was computed by the linear kernel function on pooled data.
Additionally, it is also possible to compute a kernel matrix as
if it was computed by the polynomial or radial basis kernel
function (RBF) by utilizing the resulting gram matrix. As an
example, the calculation of RBF from the gram matrix is as
follows.
K(x, y) = exp
(
− ‖x · x− 2x · y + y · y‖
2
2σ2
)
,
where “·” represents the dot product of vectors, which
is possible to obtain from the gram matrix, and σ is the
parameter utilized to adjust the similarity level. Once the
desired kernel matrix is computed, it is possible to train an
SVR model by employing the computed kernel matrix to
estimate the gaze. In the process of the computation of the
dot product, the amount of data transferred among parties is
(nfna + nfnb + na + nb + 3nf ) × d bytes where d is the
size of one data unit.
Security Analysis
A semi-honest adversary who corrupts any of the input-
parties cannot learn anything about the private inputs of the
other input-party. During the protocol execution, two vectors
of random values and a single random value are sent from
Alice to Bob. The views of the input-parties consist only of
vectors with random values. Using these random values, it is
not possible for one party to infer something about the other
party’s private inputs (U¨nal, Akgu¨n, and Pfeifer 2019).
Theorem 1. A malicious adversary A corrupting the
function-party learns nothing more than the result of gram
matrix. It is computationally infeasible for A to infer any
information about the input-parties data X and Y as long as
Perfect RE multiplication is semantically secure (Definition
1).
Proof. We first show the correctness of our solution. We
assume nf = 2. We encode the function fd(x, y) = x1y1 +
x2y2 over some finite ring R by the following DARE:
fˆd(x, y; r) = (x1 + r11, y1 + r12, x2 + r21, y2 + r22,
r12x1 + r22x2 + r3,
r11y1 + r11r12 + r21y2 + r21r22 − r3)
Given an encoding (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6), fd(x, y) is recov-
ered by computing c1c2 + c2c4 + c5 + c6.
By the concatenation lemma in (Applebaum 2017), we can
divide c5 and c6 into nf shares by using nf random values
instead of a single r3 value.
fˆd(x, y; r) = (x1 + r11, y1 + r12, r12x1 + r13,
r11y1 + r11r12 − r13,
x2 + r21, y2 + r22, r22x2 + r23,
r21y2 + r21r22 − r23)
Given an encoding (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c8),
fˆm(x1, y1; r) = (c1, c2, c3, c4)
fˆm(x2, y2; r) = (c5, c6, c7, c8)
5 10 20
Number of samples (in thousand)
0
10
20
30
40
Ti
m
e 
(s
ec
)
(a) Execution time of Alice.
5 10 20
Number of samples (in thousand)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Ti
m
e 
(s
ec
)
(b) Execution time of Bob.
5 10 20
Number of samples (in thousand)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Ti
m
e 
(s
ec
)
(c) Execution time of Server.
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(d) Prediction time of Server.
Figure 3: The execution time of (a) Alice, (b) Bob and (c) the server are given. We also demonstrate (d) the time required for the
prediction of the test samples, which are 20% of the total number of samples in each case.
By the concatenation lemma in (Applebaum 2017),
fˆd(x, y; r) = (fˆm(x1, y1; r), fˆm(x2, y2; r)) perfecly en-
codes the function fd(x, y) if Perfect RE multiplication is
semantically secure.
After showing the correctness, we analyze the security
with the simulation paradigm. In the simulation paradigm,
there is a simulator who generates the view of a party in
the execution. A partys input and output must be given to
the simulator in order to generate its view. Thus, security is
formalized by saying that a partys view can be simulatable
given its input and output and the parties learn nothing more
than what they can derive from their input and prescribed
output.
The function-party F does not have any input and output.
A simulator S can generate the views of incoming messages
received by F . S creates four vectors C1′ ,C2′ ,C3′ ,C4′ with
uniformly distributed random values using a pseudorandom
number generator G′. Finally, S outputs {C1′ ,C2′ ,C3′ ,C4′}.
In the execution of the protocol pi, A receives four mes-
sages which are masked with uniformly random values gen-
erated using a pseudorandom number generator G. The view
of A includes {C1,C2,C3,C4}. The distribution over G is
statistically close to the distribution over G′. This implies
that
{(S(C1′ , C2′ , C3′ , C4′)} c≡ {viewpiA(C1, C2, C3, C4)}
Results
To demonstrate the performance of the framework on the
gaze estimation, we conduct experiments on a PC equipped
with Intel Core i7-7500U with 2.70 GHz processor and
16 GB memory RAM. We employ varying sizes of eye
landmark data, that are 5, 000, 10, 000 and 20, 000 sam-
ples of which one-fifth is the test data. We split the data
between the input-parties equally. It is worth to note that
the framework allows us to optimize the parameters of the
model in the server without further communication with
the input-parties. Thanks to this, we utilize 5-fold cross-
validation to optimize the parameters, which are the simi-
larity adjustment parameter γ ∈ {2−3, 2−2, · · · , 24} of the
Gaussian RBF kernel, the misclassification penalty param-
eter C ∈ {2−3, 2−2, · · · , 23}, and the tolerance parameter
 ∈ {0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5, 1} of SVR. Once we opti-
mize the parameters, we repeat each of the experiment on
varying size of eye landmark data with the optimal parameter
set 10 times to assess the execution time of the framework.
To evaluate the gaze estimation results in the experiments, we
employ mean angular error in the same way as in (Park et al.
2018). Table 1 demonstrates the relationship between the size
of the dataset and the resulting mean angular error. Since no
additional noise is introduced during the computation of the
kernel matrix, the results from our privacy-preserving frame-
work are the same with the non-private ones as the same
parameters are utilized. The mean angular errors are lower as
compared to the state-of-the-art gaze estimation techniques
due to the fact that we purely use synthetic data and fixed the
camera position during image rendering.
Table 1: The mean angular errors for varying dataset sizes.
# of samples Mean angular error
5k 0.21
10k 0.18
20k 0.17
Furthermore, the amount of time to train and test the mod-
els increases as the sample sizes increase since computation
requirements get larger. The increment in the dataset size in-
creases the communication cost among parties. The execution
times of all parties for 10 runs with the optimal parameters
are shown in Figure 3. We also demonstrate the amount of
time to predict the test samples, which corresponds to one-
fifth of the total number of samples in order to emphasize
the suitability of the framework on real life applications. In
the experiment with 20, 000 samples, for instance, we spend
≈ 4.5 seconds to predict 4, 000 test samples, which corre-
sponds to 1.125 ms per sample. When the current sampling
frequencies of eye trackers or HMDs are taken into consider-
ation, it is possible to deploy and use the current framework
to estimate gaze if an optimized communication between the
parties is established.
Conclusion
In this work, we utilized a framework based on randomized
encoding to estimate human gaze in a privacy-preserving
way and in real-time. Our solution can provide improved
gaze estimation if input-parties want to use each other’s data
for different reasons such as to consider genetic structural
differences in the eye region. In our solution, none of the
input-parties has the access to the eye landmark data of the
others or the result of the computation in the function party,
while the function-party cannot infer anything about the data
of the input-parties. Temporal information of the visual scan-
path, pupillary or blink information cannot be reconstructed
due to the shuffling of the data, lack of sensory information,
and lack of direct access to the eye landmarks. The proposed
solution is capable of working in real-time, therefore it could
be deployed along with modern HMDs for different use-cases
and it could be further extended to similar eye tracking re-
lated problems if similar amount of features is used. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first work based on function-
specific privacy models in the eye tracking domain. As future
work, we will extend our solution to more number of input
and function parties.
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